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The Pich Exception: Reservations, Exceptions to
Warranty, and Exceptions to Grant in the Chain of
Title.
Zackary D. Callarman
INTRODUCTION
Attorneys and landmen alike encounter mineral reservations and
exceptions on a daily basis. While the terms “reservation” and “exception”
are not strictly synonymous, there are circumstances where an exception
and reservation achieve the same result (e.g., an interest is retained by the
grantor of the instrument).1 Generally, a reservation is the creation of a
new right or interest, by and for the grantor, in real property being granted
to another.2 On the other hand, the term exception has two definitions: (1)
a description of a portion of the thing granted, which prior to the grant had
been conveyed to another, and not necessarily so conveyed by the grantor,
but by a prior grantor, or (2) the retention of an existing right or interest,
by and for the grantor, in real property being granted to another.3 When
the language in question is construed as an “exception to warranty,” the
grantor will never retain the excepted interest. However, where the
language in question is construed as an “exception to grant,” the grantor
will retain the excepted interest if another party does not own said interest.
A competent title examiner must be able to discern the difference between
a reservation, exception to warranty, and an exception to grant, as the
consequence of mistaking one for the other could lead to malpractice
liability. This article examines Texas jurisprudence and aims to provide
rule-based guidance to attorneys and landmen for interpreting reservation
and exception provisions in the chain of title.
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1. See, e.g., Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Tex. 1957) (citing
Donnell v. Otts, 230 S.W. 864, 865 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
2. Reservation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
3. Exception, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
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DISCUSSION
First, the following analysis will present a basic explanation of
reservations and exceptions, as defined by Texas law. Thereafter, these
basic definitions will gradually evolve pursuant to the distinguishing facts
of each case examined.
A. Texas Courts Do Not Favor Reservations by Implication
Sharp v. Fowler is among the most widely cited Texas cases
addressing mineral estate reservations.4 There, the Supreme Court of
Texas stated two important rules that are universally followed by courts
addressing the issue today: (1) a reservation of minerals must be by clear
language in order to be effective; and (2) courts do not favor reservations
by implication.5 In Sharp, Frost Lumber Industries, Inc. (Frost) conveyed
29.7 acres out of the Texas Central Railway Survey No. 13 to A.D.
Cockrell (Cockrell) on February 4, 1935, excepting all of the minerals,
which were owned by Louis Werner Sawmill Company (Werner) at the
time (hereinafter referred to as the Frost Deed).6 Subsequently, Werner
conveyed all of the minerals to Frost, who then conveyed all of the
minerals to Cockrell.7 Next, Cockrell conveyed a three-fourths mineral
interest to another party, such that he then owned all of the surface and an
undivided one-fourth mineral interest.8 Thereafter, Cockrell died, and the
administrator of Cockrell’s estate conveyed said 29.7 acre tract to J.A.
Browning, describing the subject lands as: “29.7 acres of the T.C. Railway
Company No. 13, and being the same land described in a deed from
[Frost], to A.D. Cockrell, dated the 4th day of February, A.D. 1935, and of
record in Vol. 102, Page 462, Deed Records, Panola County, Texas”
(hereinafter referred to as the Administrator’s Deed).9
The successors-in-interest to Cockrell’s estate, the petitioners, argued
that the Administrator’s Deed conveyed only the surface to Browning,
reasoning that the Frost Deed, which was utilized for the legal description
in the Administrator’s Deed, conveyed only the surface.10 Conversely,
respondents, successors-in-interest to Browning, argued that the
Administrator’s Deed did not expressly except or reserve any mineral
4. 252 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1952).
5. Id. at 154 (citing Sellers v. Tex. Cent. Ry. Co., 17 S.W. 32 (Tex. 1891);
State v. Black Bros., 297 S.W. 213 (Tex. 1927)).
6. Sharp, 252 S.W.2d at 153.
7. Id. at 154.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Sharp v. Fowler, 252 S.W.2d 153, 153–54 (Tex. 1952).
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interest and that any mineral interest owned by the grantor passed to the
grantee of the Deed.11
Ultimately, the court was asked to determine whether the use of the
Frost Deed to describe the lands conveyed operated to transfer a lesser
estate than Cockrell owned at the time of the conveyance.12 In other words,
the question was whether the reference to the Frost Deed was a description
of the estate being conveyed to Browning, or merely a geographical
description of the land being conveyed.
Importantly, the court noted that the Administrator’s Deed conveyed
29.7 acres, “‘being the same land described in’ the Frost Deed,” explaining
that to describe land is to define its physical location so that it may be
located on the ground, rather than a definition of the estate conveyed by
the Deed.13 However, the court explained that if the clause in the
Administrator’s Deed transferred the same “land conveyed in the Frost
Deed,” the outcome would have been different.14 Noting that the language
in the Administrator’s Deed did not evidence an intention to reserve the
one-fourth mineral interest that the Estate owned at the time of
conveyance, the court concluded that the interest passed to the grantee,
and ultimately vested in the Respondents.15
B. Klein Court Holds that Exception of Interest Identical to Previously
Reserved Interest was Included Only as an Exception to Warranty
When the provision in question expresses an intent only to except a
previously reserved interest, Texas courts will construe the provision as an
exception to warranty and will not credit the grantor with ownership of the
excepted interest.16 Such was the case in Klein v. Humble Oil & Refining
Co., where by warranty deed dated May 29, 1928, Robert Stein and his
wife conveyed a tract of land to F.F. Klein (hereinafter the Stein Deed)
with the following reservation:
Grantors herein, however, reserve for themselves, their heirs and
assigns, one-eighth (1/8) of all mineral rights in and under [ten]
acres of land, running north and south, on the east end of the
[sixty] acres herein conveyed, and it is understood and agreed that
if no production of oil is had on said [ten] acres within a period of
11. Id. at 153–54.
12. Id. at 154.
13. Id. at 154 (emphasis added).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Klein v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 67 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ.
App.–Beaumont 1934, writ granted), aff’d, 86 S.W.2d 1077 (Tex. 1935).
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[twenty] years, this reservation shall terminate and become null
and void, and it is further understood that grantors herein are not
to participate in any oil lease or rental bonuses that may be paid
on any lease on said above described land, and hereby waive any
rights they may have or be entitled to in any future oil or gas
lease.17
Subsequently, by warranty deed dated July 16, 1928, F.F. Klein and his
wife conveyed the same tract of land to D.D. Baker (hereinafter the Klein
Deed) with the following provisions:
There is however excepted from this conveyance [one-eighth] of all
mineral rights in and under [t]en acres of land running north and south
on the east end of said [sixty] acres, and it is understood that if no
production of oil is had on said [ten] acres within a period of [t]wenty
years from May 29, 1928, then this reservation shall lapse. Also
understood that the owner of said rights is not to participate in any oil
lease or rental bonuses that may be paid for any lease, and have no
interest in any future oil and gas lease . . . . The property herein
conveyed is the same conveyed to us by Robert Stein and wife by
deed dated May 29, 1928, and recorded in Guadalupe County, Deed
Record Book 97, p. 398.18
Thereafter, when oil was discovered on the subject lands, Klein,
believing that he owned a one-eighth mineral interest in the subject lands
pursuant to the above provision, began conveying portions of the mineral
interest to various other parties.19 Next, after acquiring an oil and gas lease
covering the interest of Stein and his successors-in-interest, the Humble
Company (Humble) began producing oil and gas from the lands; however,
Humble did not pay Klein and his successors-in-interest for the one-eighth
interest that he claimed he owned.20 As a result, Klein brought suit against
Humble, claiming that he excepted in himself an undivided one-eighth
mineral interest in the deed from him to Baker and was thus due his share
of the lease benefits.21 At trial, the court denied Klein any recovery, and
Klein subsequently appealed.22
On appeal, the court first explained that the cardinal rule in deed
construction cases is to ascertain the intention of the parties from an
17. Id. at 912.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 913.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Klein v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 67 S.W.2d 911, 913 (Tex. Civ. App.–
Beaumont 1934, writ granted), aff’d, 86 S.W.2d 1077 (Tex. 1935).
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examination of the entire instrument.23 The court further cited two
common canons of construction, noting that: (1) any doubt as to the
language of the deed will be resolved against the grantor and in favor of
the grantee (the Construe Against the Grantor Rule); and (2) that a deed
will be construed as passing the entire fee-simple estate unless there are
express words limiting the estate conveyed (the Greatest Estate Rule).24 In
addition, though noting that an exception and reservation may sometimes
achieve the same result, the court distinguished the two.25 It explained that
a reservation must always be in favor of the grantor, while an exception is
a mere exclusion from the grant and is in favor of the grantor only if the
excepted interest is not owned by another party.26
Next, the court emphasized the location of the granting paragraph and
exception paragraph in the Klein Deed, respectively, explaining that Klein
first conveyed “all that certain tract of land” (including a legal description
of the land conveyed), followed by a separate paragraph laying out the
exception of a one-eighth term mineral interest.27 The court reasoned that
the legal effect of the structure of the Klein Deed was to: (1) convey a feesimple estate in all of the subject lands except a one-eighth mineral
interest; and (2) provide warranty to the grantee covering the entire subject
lands except the one-eighth mineral interest.28
The court then dissected the language of the exception provision in the
Klein Deed by contrasting it with the language of the reservation provision
in the Stein Deed. While the grantors in the Stein Deed “reserve[d] for
themselves,” the Klein Deed merely stated that a one-eighth interest was
“excepted from this conveyance,” which evidenced that Klein did not
intend to retain an interest in favor of himself.29
In addition, the fact that Stein reserved a twenty year term mineral
interest from the date of the Stein Deed (May 29, 1928) was a factor in the
court’s analysis. While the Stein Deed reserved the one-eighth interest for
a period of twenty years, the Klein Deed (dated July 26, 1928) excepted
the one-eighth interest for “a period of twenty years from May 29, 1928,”
which was the date of the Stein Deed, and was evidence that Klein
intended only to except Stein’s prior term interest for warranty purposes.30
Further, the Stein Deed reservation provided that the “grantors herein are
23. Id. at 914.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 915.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 914–15.
28. Klein v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 67 S.W.2d 911, 915–16 (Tex. Civ.
App.–Beaumont 1934, writ granted), aff’d, 86 S.W.2d 1077 (Tex. 1935).
29. Id. at 916.
30. Id.
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not to participate in any oil lease,” while the Klein Deed exception
provided that “the owner of said rights is not to participate in any oil
lease.”31 This, according to the court, was further evidence that Klein was
excepting only the rights that were owned by another party (Stein) to
protect Klein on his warranty to Baker.32
Lastly, the court highlighted the provision following the exception
provision in the Klein Deed to support its ultimate conclusion. The
provision identifies the lands conveyed by Klein to Baker as being “the
same conveyed to us by Robert Stein and wife,” and includes a reference
to the recording information for the Stein Deed.33 According to the court,
the effect of this reference was to clarify the intention of the parties.34 In
other words, this clause indicated that Klein intended to convey to Baker
the identical lands and interest that Klein received from Stein, being the
subject lands less a one-eighth mineral interest.35 Ultimately, the court
explained that if Klein intended to retain a one-eighth mineral interest in
the lands, he would have expressed that intent prominently in the disputed
provision.36 After noting the absence of an express intent to reserve the
mineral interest, the court concluded that Klein did not retain any interest
in the subject lands.37
C. The Pich Exception–A False Recital Will Not Operate to Nullify a
Clear Exception from the Conveyance
Where a deed includes a clear and unambiguous exception followed
by a “false recital” purporting to state why the exception is made, the
provision will be construed as excepting an interest in favor of the grantor
if said interest is not owned by another party.38 Generally, a recital is
defined as a formal statement included in a deed or writing to explain the
reasons upon which the transaction is founded.39 The recital is a “false
recital” when the parties to the instrument include the recital in error.40

31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 913–14.
34. Klein v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 67 S.W.2d 911, 915–16 (Tex. Civ.
App.–Beaumont 1934, writ granted), aff’d, 86 S.W.2d 1077 (Tex. 1935).
35. Id. at 916.
36. Id. at 917.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Tex. 1957).
39. 4 ALOYSIUS A. LEOPOLD, TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES: LAND TITLES AND
TITLE EXAMINATION § 21.10 (3rd ed. 2005).
40. 4 ALOYSIUS A. LEOPOLD, TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES: LAND TITLES AND
TITLE EXAMINATION § 16.10 (3rd ed. 2005).
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In Pich v. Lankford, L.A. Pich conveyed the subject lands to F.D.
Turner on September 28, 1928, reserving “one[-]half of the full [oneeighth] [o]il [r]oyalty, or a [one-sixteenth] of all minerals produced on said
land.”41 Next, on May 20, 1929, Turner conveyed the subject lands to
Lewis B. Adams with no exceptions or reservations.42 Then, on February
27, 1930, Adams conveyed the subject lands to S.J. Higgs, reserving
“one[-]fourth of all royalty, the same being [one thirty-second]1/32 of all
oil and gas produced from said land.”43 Frank S. Magers, administrator of
S.J. Higgs’s estate, conveyed all of the estate’s right, title and interest in
the subject lands to Collins Howard on October 18, 1941, with no
exceptions or reservations.44
Subsequently, on January 26, 1943, Howard conveyed the subject
lands to W.J. Sharp and his wife, Emma E. Sharp (hereinafter the Howard
Deed).45 The Howard Deed included the following language: “Save and
Except an undivided three-fourths of the oil, gas and other minerals in, on
and under said land, which have been heretofore reserved.”46 On
September 26, 1947, the Sharps conveyed the subject lands to A.H. and
B.L. Lankford (hereinafter the Sharp Deed).47 The Sharp Deed contained
the following provision: “Save and Except an undivided three-fourths of
the oil, gas and other minerals in and under the Southwest Quarter thereof,
and an undivided one-fourth of the minerals in and under the remainder of
said survey, which minerals do not belong to the grantors herein.”48
Thereafter, on November 15, 1955, Howard quitclaimed to L.A. Pich all
right, title and interest in the three-fourths mineral interest excepted and
reserved in the deed from Howard to Sharp.49 On December 12, 1955,
Sharp quitclaimed to L.A. Pich all right, title and interest in the threefourths mineral interest excepted and reserved in the deed from Sharp to
Lankford.50
Finally, Lankford, the original plaintiff, sued Pich et al., arguing that
the grantors’ intent in the Howard and Sharp Deeds was to convey all
interest owned by the grantors and that the language in those deeds did not
reserve any interest in favor of the grantors.51 In addition, Lankford
asserted that the exception language in the Howard and Sharp Deeds
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Pich, 302 S.W.2d at 646.
Id.
Id.
Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 646 (Tex. 1957).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 646–47.
Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 647 (Tex. 1957).
Id.
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created a “cloud on [plaintiff]’s title” and sought to have the cloud on title
removed.52 Ultimately, the trial court ruled that Lankford was the owner
of the entire mineral estate, less the previously reserved royalty interests.53
On appeal, the Amarillo Court of Civil Appeals, citing Klein, affirmed the
trial court’s judgment; however, Pich’s subsequent writ of error to the
Supreme Court of Texas was granted.54
On review, Pich argued that: (1) the effect of the language in the
Howard and Sharp Deeds was to except an undivided three-fourths
mineral interest from the grant; (2) the fact that a false reason may have
been given for the exception does not alter the effect of the exception; (3)
said interest was necessarily retained by the grantor because no one else
in the chain of title owned it; and (4) he owned said interest as the
successor-in-interest to Howard and Sharp.55 Contrarily, Lankford argued
that neither Howard nor Sharp intended to retain a mineral interest in their
respective deeds, but rather inserted the exception provisions to account
for the previously reserved royalty interests and thus to protect themselves
for warranty purposes.56
In its analysis, the court began by noting that a mineral interest and a
royalty interest are distinct interests in land.57 Moreover, the court
explained that an interest in land excepted from the grant will not pass to
the grantee.58 After reflecting upon the specific language of the disputed
provisions in the Howard and Sharp Deeds, the court reasoned that instead
of excepting only such interests as “have heretofore been reserved” or that
“do not belong to the grantors herein,” each deed expressly excepted an
undivided three-fourths mineral interest in plain and unambiguous
language.59 The court further stated that each exception was followed by a
recital that purported to explain why the interest was excepted.60 Recalling
that there were no prior mineral reservations in the chain of title—there
were only royalty reservations—the court identified the recitals in the
Howard and Sharp Deeds as “false recitals.”61 Citing Roberts v. Robertson,
a Vermont Supreme Court case, the court adduced that including a false
reason for an exception from the grant will not diminish the effect of the

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 647–48.
56. Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Tex. 1957).
57. Id. (citing Richardson v. Hart, 185 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1945)).
58. Id. (citing King v. First Nat’l Bank of Wichita Falls, 192 S.W.2d 260, 262
(Tex. 1946)).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (emphasis added).
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exception or operate to vest the grantee of the deed with the excepted
interest.62
Though not binding, Roberts exemplified the court’s logic in Pich and
bears noting. In Roberts, the grantor, J.C. Roberts, conveyed several
specifically identified tracts of land, with the following provision: “Said
J.C. Roberts reserving lots sold, Nos. 1, 2, 3, [ . . . ] 32, 33.”63 While the
majority of the enumerated lots listed in the provision had been sold, lots
32 and 33 had not. There, the court held that the effect of the structure of
the provision above was to except lots 32 and 33 from the grant, despite
the fact that said lots had not been previously sold.64 In other words, the
false recital that lots 32 and 33 had been previously sold did not alter the
fact that lots 32 and 33 were excepted from the grant, and were not
conveyed to the grantee by the deed. The court further noted that the result
of the case would have been different if the provision instead stated, “I
except all the lots heretofore sold,” as such would indicate only an
exception to warranty.65
The Pich court next cited its holding in Umscheid v. Scholz to further
support its reasoning.66 In that case, the deed at issue conveyed a tract of
land with the following provision: “[I]t being understood that the public
thoroughfare formerly existing along the edge of the river at this point is
not intended to be conveyed by these presents, the corporation of the [C]ity
of Bexar having the right to open said thoroughfare when it sees fit.”67
Thereafter, the successors-in-interest to the grantee in the abovereferenced deed claimed title to lands that were previously used as a
thoroughfare.68 Though noting that there was no evidence that the City had
the right to open said thoroughfare, the court in Scholz determined that:
(1) the exception was not affected by the false recital; (2) the land was
effectively excepted from the grant; and (3) said land did not pass to the
grantee of the deed.69
Returning to the facts of Pich, the court rejected Lankford’s argument
that Howard and Sharp included the exception provisions merely for
warranty purposes.70 The court contrasted the prior reservations of royalty
interests from the express exception of a three-fourths mineral interest in
62. Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Tex. 1957) (citing Roberts v.
Robertson, 53 Vt. 690. (1881)).
63. Roberts, 53 Vt. at 692.
64. Id. at 693.
65. Id.
66. Pich, 302 S.W.2d at 649 (citing Umscheid v. Scholz, 16 S.W. 1065 (Tex.
1891)).
67. Umscheid, 16 S.W. at 1066.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1066–67.
70. Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 649–50 (Tex. 1957).
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the Howard and Sharp Deeds, explaining that construing the Howard and
Sharp Deeds as excepting only the royalty interests for warranty purposes
would be reforming the deeds.71 Restated, the court refused to construe the
provisions as an exception of the prior reserved royalty interests because
the Howard and Sharp Deed provisions were an express exception of a
mineral interest.72
Furthermore, though the Lankfords relied on Klein to support their
position, the court expressly distinguished the case from Klein. In Klein,
the subsequently excepted interest was identical to the prior reserved
interest—a one-eighth mineral interest.73 As noted above, the prior
reservation in this case was a royalty interest and the subsequently
excepted interest was a mineral interest, which was critical to the court’s
reasoning.74
After all, the court reasoned that though the language of the Howard
Deed did not expressly reserve an interest in favor of Howard,75 the
language effectively excepted a three-fourths mineral interest from the
grant.76 Moreover, because no one else in the chain of title had previously
reserved said three-fourths mineral interest, the interest remained in
Howard and ultimately vested in Pich via quitclaim deed. As a result, the
court adjudged Pich the owner of an undivided three-fourths mineral
interest in the subject lands, reversed both lower courts’ judgments, and
remanded to the trial court for entry of a consistent judgment.77
D. A False Recital Stating that a Mineral Interest Had Been Previously
Conveyed, Without Words Expressing a Clear Intent to Reserve or to
Except Said Interest, Will Be Construed as an Exception to Warranty
Where a false recital appears at the beginning of the provision and
does not clearly express an intent to reserve or except an interest from the
grant, Texas courts will construe the provision as an exception to
warranty.78 In Ladd v. DuBose, the Republic Insurance Company
conveyed the subject lands to Porter and Bosworth on March 1, 1943,
71. Id.
72. Id. at 650 (emphasis added).
73. See supra text accompanying note 29.
74. Pich, 302 S.W.2d at 650.
75. The court only discusses the interest of Howard, here, because once
Howard excepted the three-fourths mineral interest in the deed to Sharp, the recital
in the deed from Sharp to Lankford that the grantor did not own a three-fourths
mineral interest was no longer false.
76. Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Tex. 1957).
77. Id.
78. Ladd v. DuBose, 344 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Tex. Civ. App.–Amarillo 1961,
no writ).
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reserving a one-fourth mineral interest for a fifteen year term, provided
that said interest shall terminate unless minerals are being produced in
paying quantities at the end of the term.79 Porter and Bosworth
subsequently conveyed the lands to J.L. Ladd et al., with no exceptions or
reservations. Thereafter, on December 8, 1947, J.L. Ladd et al. conveyed
the subject lands to Frank F. DuBose (hereinafter the Ladd Deed) with the
following provisions:
It is agreed and understood that a one-fourth mineral interest
has been heretofore sold and it is further understood and agreed
that a one-fourth mineral interest in said land together with the
right of ingress and egress thereon, is reserved to the grantors,
their heirs and assigns, and is excepted from this grant. It is the
intention of this instrument to convey the vendee a one-half
mineral interest, together will all surface rights.80
At trial, the parties did not contest that Ladd clearly reserved a onefourth mineral interest in himself.81 However, the interest at issue was the
outstanding one-fourth mineral interest depicted in the bold language
above (previously reserved by Republic Insurance Company), which
terminated on March 1, 1948, after there was no mineral production from
the subject lands.82
After the trial court adjudged DuBose to be the owner of the onefourth interest at issue, Ladd appealed, asserting that the deed
unambiguously conveyed only the surface and a one-half mineral interest
to DuBose and that the one-fourth interest at issue thus remained with the
grantor (Ladd).83 Conversely, DuBose argued that the clause stating that
Ladd’s intention was “to convey to vendee a one-half mineral interest,
together with all surface rights,”84 was included only as a limitation of
warranty, given that: (1) Ladd expressly reserved a one-fourth mineral
interest in the deed; (2) Republic Insurance Company, at the time of the
deed, still owned a term one-fourth mineral interest; and (3) Ladd, after
his reservation, could only convey a present one-half mineral interest to
DuBose.85
The court began its analysis by defining the interests at issue. At the
time of the Ladd Deed, dated December 8, 1947, Republic owned a
79. Id. at 478.
80. Id. at 477–78 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 478. As shown by the italicized language in the above provision.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Ladd v. DuBose, 344 S.W.2d 476, 478 (Tex. Civ. App.–Amarillo 1961,
no writ).
85. Id.
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determinable fee in one-fourth of the minerals. Ladd owned the future
interest following the determinable fee (known as a possibility of reverter),
which means that in the event that there was no mineral production in
paying quantities on March 1, 1948, said one-fourth mineral interest would
vest back into Ladd.86
The issue, then, was whether the bold language in the provision above,
together with the subsequent intention clause expressed an intent to
reserve the possibility of reverter that followed Republic’s term interest,
which Ladd owned at the time of the deed.87
While noting that Ladd clearly reserved a separate one-fourth mineral
interest in the deed, the court distinguished that clause from the clause at
issue to reach its conclusion. The court reasoned that the terms “reserve”
and “except” pertained only to Ladd’s additional one-fourth mineral
reservation, and that the “agreed and understood” language in bold above
did not indicate an intent to except or reserve the possibility of reverter.88
Essentially, if Ladd had intended to except or reserve the possibility of
reverter, he could have easily done so by utilizing the correct language,
which he failed to do. The court briefly concluded that the intention clause
following the exception and reservation paragraph was included only as a
limitation of warranty.89
Next, noting similarities between the facts of the current case and the
out-of-state case of Whitman v. Harrison,90 the court explained that an
exception must be construed as an exception to the warranty unless the
grantor included the appropriate words in the instrument to express an
intent to reserve the interest at issue.91 In Whitman, the grantor owned all
of the surface rights of an eighty acre tract, with five mineral acres in fee,
and a reversionary mineral interest as to sixty out of the eighty acres.92
There, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the grantor’s conveyance
of the entire eighty acres, subject to the prior mineral conveyances
covering seventy-five acres, conveyed all of the grantor’s reversionary
interest in the sixty acres because the grantor did not include any words
expressing an intent to reserve the reversionary interest.93
Returning to Texas authority, the court in Ladd cited several deed
construction rules, all of which were variations of the Greatest Estate Rule
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 478–79.
89. Id. at 479.
90. 327 P.2d 680 (Okla. 1958).
91. Ladd v. DuBose, 344 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Tex. Civ. App.–Amarillo 1961,
no writ) (citing Whitman, 327 P.2d at 682).
92. Whitman, 327 P.2d at 681–82.
93. Whitman, 327 P.2d at 683.
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and the Construe Against the Grantor Rule to justify its position.94 First,
when the conveyance is made by warranty deed, it “will be construed to
confer upon the grantee the greatest estate that the terms of the instrument
will permit.”95 Second, any doubt as to the proper construction of a deed
is to be resolved against the grantor.96 Finally, “where a deed is capable of
two constructions[,] the one most favorable to the grantee and which
conveys the largest interest [that] the grantor could convey will be
adopted.”97
Interestingly, the court distinguished Ladd from Pich, explaining that
the instrument in Pich included an express reservation, while the current
case—with respect to the possibility of reverter—did not.98 It appears that
the use of the word “reservation,” in the court’s analysis of Pich, was to
use the word loosely, as the interest retained by the grantor in Pich was
construed as an exception from the grant, not a reservation.99 While Ladd
and Pich are fairly distinguishable, the court’s analysis of Ladd in relation
to Pich left a bit to be desired. In the absence of a thorough court
discussion, it could be helpful to seek guidance by reviewing the
distinguishing facts of each case. In Pich, the exception appeared at the
beginning of the provision and was separated from the false recital by a
comma: “Save and Except an undivided three[-]fourths of the oil, gas and
other minerals in, on and under said land, which have been heretofore
reserved.”100
Yet, in Ladd, the provision at issue did not include express reserve or
except language regarding the one-fourth possibility of reverter; rather, the
language explained that the parties understand that a one-fourth interest
had been sold prior to the conveyance:
It is agreed and understood that a one-fourth mineral interest has
been heretofore sold and it is further understood and agreed that a
one-fourth mineral interest in said land together with the right of
ingress and egress thereon, is reserved to the grantors, their heirs
and assigns, and is excepted from this grant.101

94. Ladd, 344 S.W.2d at 480.
95. Id. at 480 (citing Waters v. Ellis, 312 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Tex. 1958)).
96. Id. (citing Garrett v. Dils Co., 299 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tex. 1957)).
97. Ladd v. DuBose, 344 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Tex. Civ. App.–Amarillo 1961, no
writ) (citing Chestnut v. Casner, 42 S.W.2d 175, 178 (Tex. Civ. App.–Austin 1931,
writ ref’d)).
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 650 (Tex. 1957) (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 646 (emphasis added).
101. Ladd, 344 S.W.2d at 477 (emphasis added).
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Unlike Pich, the purported exception in Ladd is essentially a false
recital appearing at the beginning of the provision that, according to the
court, did not express a clear intent to except or reserve an interest from
the grant.102 Ultimately, the court reasoned that crediting Ladd as reserving
or excepting the possibility of reverter from the grant would be to credit a
reservation by implication, which Texas law expressly forbids.103 Thus,
the court adjudged DuBose to be the owner of an undivided three-fourths
mineral interest in the lands at issue, being the one-half mineral interest
expressly conveyed, plus the one-fourth possibility of reverter that had
since merged into a fee mineral interest after the expiration of the fifteen
year term.104
E. An Exception Only of Prior Reserved Interests Will Not Effectuate an
Exception in Favor of the Grantor, Even if There Are No Such Prior
Reservations
Similarly, where the false recital of a prior reservation or exception
appears in the same clause as the purported exception, the provision will be
construed as an exception to warranty only, and will not operate to except
an interest in favor of the grantor.105 In Miller v. Melde, Allen conveyed the
subject lands to K.R. Miller, with no exceptions or reservations.106
Subsequently, Miller conveyed the subject lands to the Bergstroms
(hereinafter the Miller Deed) with the following provision: “However, there
is reserved and excepted in prior conveyances one-half . . . of the oil, gas
and other minerals in or under said premises for a term of fifteen . . . years
from the date of said reservation.”107 At trial, the court determined that
Miller did not reserve any interest in the land.108 As a result, Miller
appealed.109
On appeal, Miller, relying on Pich, argued that he effectively reserved
a one-half mineral interest in the land pursuant to the provision in the
Miller Deed.110 However, the court disagreed, reasoning that the provision
at issue did not reserve or except a mineral interest in clear and

102. Id. at 478–79.
103. Ladd v. DuBose, 344 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Tex. Civ. App.–Amarillo 1961,
no writ) (citing Sharp v. Fowler, 252 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Tex. 1952)).
104. Id. at 480.
105. Miller v. Melde, 730 S.W.2d 12, 13 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1987, no
writ).
106. Id. at 12.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 13.
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unambiguous language.111 Moreover, the court distinguished the case from
Pich, explaining that the Miller Deed only excepted from the grant the
mineral interests that were “reserved and excepted in prior
conveyances.”112 Because there were no prior reservations or exceptions
in the chain of title, the court reasoned that Miller did not effectively
except any interest from the grant.113 As a result, the court determined that
Bergstrom acquired all of the mineral interest owned by Miller.114
F. Conveyance Made “Subject to” a Purported Reservation in a Deed
Restriction Instrument Will Not Effectuate a Reservation in Favor of the
Grantor
Likewise, where a conveyance is made “subject to” prior reservations
in the chain of title, and the instrument itself does not express an intent to
reserve or except an interest in favor of the grantor, Texas courts will
construe the language as an exception to warranty.115 In Farm & Ranch
Investors, Ltd. v. Titan Operating, LLC, Caldwell’s Creek, Ltd. (Caldwell)
owned a sixty acre tract of land known as Caldwell’s Creek Addition
(Addition).116 Thereafter, Caldwell filed a dedication and restrictions
instrument in the county deed records covering said land.117 The
instrument included the following restriction: “No oil drilling, oil
development operations, oil refining, quarrying or mining operations of
any kind shall be permitted upon or on any lot. All mineral rights shall
belong and shall continue to belong to the limited partnership of
Caldwell’s Creek, L[td].”118
From 1994 to 1999, Caldwell conveyed, via warranty deed, lots out of
the Addition to various parties.119 None of the deeds included an express
mineral reservation;120 however, each deed included the following
provision: “This conveyance is made subject to any and all easements,
restrictions, and mineral reservations affecting said property that are filed

111. Miller v. Melde, 730 S.W.2d 12, 13 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 1987, no
writ).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Farm & Ranch Investors, Ltd. v. Titan Operating, LLC, 369 S.W.3d 679
(Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2012, petition denied).
116. Id. at 680.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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for record in the office of the County Clerk of Tarrant County, Texas.”121 In
2005, Caldwell, believing itself to be the owner of all of the mineral estate
of the Addition, purported to convey all of the mineral estate to Farm &
Ranch Investors, Ltd. (Farm & Ranch).122 Later in 2008, Farm & Ranch
sought to execute an oil and gas lease covering the Addition with Titan
Operating, LLC (Titan).123 However, Titan believed that Farm & Ranch did
not own any interest in the lands, and instead executed leases with the
various grantees of the deeds from Caldwell.124 As a result, Titan sued Farm
& Ranch in order to remove the cloud on title, and the trial court determined
that Farm & Ranch did not own any mineral interest in the Addition.125
On appeal, Farm & Ranch contended that: (1) the deed restrictions filed
by Caldwell operated to reserve the mineral estate in favor of Caldwell; and
(2) that the “subject to” language in the subsequent deeds effectively
conveyed only the surface to the grantees of said deeds.126 In its first holding,
the court explained that Caldwell did not reserve a mineral interest in the
Addition because Caldwell already owned both the surface and the minerals
at the time that Caldwell filed the dedication and restrictions instrument.127
Citing precedent, the court noted that an owner of lands could not reserve in
himself an interest in property that he already owns.128
Moreover, although Farm & Ranch argued that the phrase stating that the
mineral rights “shall continue to belong” to the limited partnership was a clear
reservation, the court dismissed this argument on account that the instrument
in question was not a conveyance or a lease, but was merely a dedication and
deed restriction instrument, which thus could not reserve an interest.129
In its second holding, the court determined that the phrase “shall
continue to belong” could not be interpreted as a future reservation.130
Instead, the court agreed with the trial court’s interpretation that the
dedication and deed restrictions instrument would not operate to deprive
Caldwell of the mineral interest that it owned at the time of the filing.131

121. Farm & Ranch Investors, Ltd. v. Titan Operating, LLC, 369 S.W.3d 679,
680 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2012, petition denied).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 680–81.
126. Id. at 681.
127. Farm & Ranch Investors, Ltd. v. Titan Operating, LLC, 369 S.W.3d 679,
681 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2012, petition denied).
128. Id. (citing Reeves v. Towery, 621 S.W.2d 209, 213 (Tex. App.–Corpus
Christi 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
129. Id. at 682.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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The court then examined each of the deeds from Caldwell to the
various other lot owners, noting that the language in each deed did not
expressly reserve or except any interest, but rather stated that the
conveyance was subject to any mineral reservations of record.132 The court
further cited the reasoning of its sister court in a similar case, noting that
“subject to” language is generally construed as a limitation of warranty,
and not a reservation or exception in favor of the grantor.133 After
analyzing the holding of its sister court and citing the Greatest Estate Rule,
the court determined that the “subject to” provision in this case was
included as an exception to warranty only.134
Lastly, the court analyzed the effect of the “subject to” clause in
context of the purported reservation in the deed restriction instrument. The
court restated its holding that the deed restriction instrument did not
reserve a mineral interest in favor of Caldwell, and thus reasoned that the
case was akin to Miller, where the provision at issue only excepted prior
reserved interests.135 Like Miller, the court reasoned that the deeds from
Caldwell did not effectively reserve or except an interest in favor of
Caldwell because: (1) the deed provisions merely made the conveyances
subject to any mineral reservations of record; and (2) there were no
mineral reservations of record.136 Thus, the court concluded that Farm &
Ranch, as successor-in-interest to Caldwell, did not own any mineral
interest in the subject lands.137
G. The Term “Reserve” and/or “Except” is Not Requisite to
Reserve/Except an Interest in Favor of the Grantor
In Houchins v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., the court held that the terms
“reserve” and/or “except” were not necessary in order to effectuate a
mineral reservation/exception in favor of the grantor.138 By Warranty Deed
dated February 2, 1994, Phillip H. Trew conveyed the subject lands to
Darrell E. Houchins and Cynthia A. Houchins.139 The warranty deed
included the following provision:
132. Id. at 682–83.
133. Farm & Ranch Investors, Ltd. v. Titan Operating, LLC, 369 S.W.3d 679,
683 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2012, petition denied) (citing Wright v. E.P.
Operating Ltd. P’ship, 978 S.W.2d 684, 688 (Tex. App.–Eastland 1998, petition
denied)).
134. Id. at 683–84.
135. Id. at 684.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. No. 01-08-00273-CV, 2009 WL 3321406 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.]
Oct. 15, 2009, petition denied) (memorandum opinion).
139. Id. at *1.
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This conveyance is expressly made subject to any and all
restrictions, covenants and easements, if any, relating to the
hereinabove described property, but only to the extent they are still
in effect, shown of record . . . and to all zoning laws, regulations
and ordinances of municipal or other governmental authorities, if
any, but only to the extent they are still in effect, relating to the
hereinabove described property. This conveyance is also
expressly subject to all restrictions, covenants and easements set
forth in the Note and Deed of Trust executed and delivered to
Grantor. To the extent that Grantor maintains any mineral rights
to the subject property, Grantor expressly retains such mineral
rights and exempts same from the conveyance herein. Grantees
accept property in its ‘AS IS’ condition.140
In 2001, Trew executed an oil and gas lease covering the subject lands,
and the Devon Energy Production Company (Devon), as successor-ininterest to the original lessee, prepared to drill for oil and gas on said
lands.141 The Houchinses, claiming to be the owners of the mineral interest
in the lands, denied Devon access to the lands; subsequently, Devon
sued.142 At trial, the court granted Devon’s motion for summary judgment,
holding that Trew unambiguously reserved all of the minerals in the
subject lands, and the Houchinses appealed.143
On appeal, the Houchinses relied on Klein and argued that the language
stating that the Grantor “expressly retains [the] mineral rights to the subject
property and exempts same from the conveyance” was merely an exception
to warranty and did not operate to reserve an interest in favor of Trew.144
The Houchinses further supported their argument by noting that the
provision preceding the language excepted only easements and other
restrictions of record.145 Further, the Houchinses argued that the clause
should be construed in context of its surrounding language.146 In addition,
the Houchinses contended that the use of “retain” and “exempt” was similar
to Klein and did not express a clear intent to reserve the minerals.147
In its analysis, the court began by distinguishing the case from Klein.
It reasoned that Trew’s reference to a specific “[g]rantor” in the provision
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at *2.
144. Houchins v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., No. 01-08-00273-CV, 2009 WL
3321406, at *2 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 15, 2009, petition denied)
(memorandum opinion).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at *3.
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was unlike Klein—where the excepted interest was in favor of the “owner
of said rights.”148 Instead, the court explained that when construing deed
language as an exception or reservation, its objective is to determine the
parties’ expressed intent within the four corners of the instrument.149
Moreover, rather than attempting to discern the subjective intent of the
parties, the court will examine all of the language within the deed to
determine the intent of the parties as expressed by the instrument.150
After a discussion of the above rules, the court held that the disputed
language expressed a clear intent to reserve the mineral estate from the
conveyance.151 The court noted that to hold otherwise would utterly
disregard the language of the deed, which is contrary to the court’s role in
a deed construction case.152 Furthermore, the court relied upon the
dictionary definitions of “maintain” and “retain” to support its conclusion.
Quoting both Black’s Law Dictionary and Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary, the court held that the definition of “maintain” was to
“continue in possession of (property, etc.),” and “retain” was “to keep in
possession or use.”153 Therefore, the use of these words sufficiently
expressed Trew’s intent to reserve the mineral estate in the lands.154
In their final contention, the Houchinses argued that the deed was
ambiguous and should thus be reformed. The court disagreed, stating that a
mere disagreement over the interpretation of a deed provision does not
render it ambiguous.155 Rather, in order to be ambiguous, the deed must be
susceptible to more than one meaning, and each potential meaning must be
reasonable.156 After holding that the deed in question was not ambiguous,
the court concluded that Trew clearly retained the mineral estate in the
lands.157 Thus, affirming the trial court’s holding on the matter.158

148. Id.
149. Id. (citing Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. 1991)).
150. Houchins v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., No. 01-08-00273-CV, 2009 WL
3321406, at *3 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 15, 2009, petition denied)
(memorandum opinion).
151. Id. at *4.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Houchins v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., No. 01-08-00273-CV, 2009 WL
3321406, at *4 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 15, 2009, petition denied)
(memorandum opinion).
157. Id. at *5.
158. Id.
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H. When a Deed Identifies the Excepted Interest by Providing the
Recording Information for the Instrument Where the Interest was
Originally Excepted or Reserved, the Exception Will Be Construed as an
Exception to Warranty
In Thomason v. Badgett, Dan Reese conveyed the subject lands to
Kenneth Hopkins in 1996 (hereinafter the Reese Deed), reserving a onehalf mineral interest.159 Then, Hopkins conveyed the lands to Thomason
and Lupton (hereinafter the Hopkins Deed) “save and except” the Reeses’
one-half mineral interest as shown in the Reese Deed.160 Next, Thomason
and Lupton subdivided the lands and conveyed the lots to various
parties.161 Each deed included one of the following clauses:
SAVE AND EXCEPT: ALL OIL, GAS AND OTHER
MINERALS AS RECORDED IN [the Reese Deed] AND [the
Hopkins deed].
SAVE & EXCEPT: OIL, GAS AND OTHER MINERALS AS
RECORDED IN [the Reese deed] AND [the Hopkins deed].
SAVE & EXCEPT: ALL OIL, GAS AND OTHER MINERALS
AS RECORDED IN [the Reese deed] AND OTHER OIL, GAS
AND MINERALS AS RECORDED IN [the Hopkins deed].162
Thereafter, Thomason and Lupton leased the subject lands to Devon
Energy Production Company (Devon), asserting that they owned an
undivided one-half mineral interest in the lands.163 Devon then notified
Thomason and Lupton that it was concerned that Thomason and Lupton
did not own a mineral interest in the lands.164 Thomason and Lupton
subsequently sued the current lot owners in a trespass to try title action.165
The trial court granted motion for summary judgment in favor of the
current owner, the Badgett family.166 As a result, Thomason and Lupton
appealed.167
159. No. 02-12-00303-CV, 2013 WL 3488254, at *1 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth
July 11, 2013, petition denied) (memorandum opinion).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Thomason v. Badgett, No. 02-12-00303-CV, 2013 WL 3488254, at *1
(Tex. App.–Fort Worth July 11, 2013, petition denied) (memorandum opinion).
166. Id.
167. Id.
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On appeal, Thomason and Badgett cited Pich, arguing that although
they did not expressly reserve a mineral interest, they effectively excepted
a mineral interest from the grant in their favor.168 Moreover, Thomason
and Lupton argued that while the Reese Deed reserved a one-half mineral
interest, the majority of their deeds to the current landowners excepted
“all” of the mineral estate, which effectively meant that Thomason and
Lupton retained the remaining one-half mineral interest that they owned
at the time of each conveyance.169
The court ultimately disagreed with Thomason and Lupton, explaining
first that the exception in the deeds to the current owners did not
specifically describe the excepted interest, but rather only directed the
reader to two prior deeds in the chain of title—the Reese and Hopkins
Deeds.170 Further, the court reasoned that though the Reese Deed
effectively reserved a one-half mineral interest, the Hopkins Deed only
excepted the interest as reserved in the Reese Deed; so the Hopkins Deed
did not reserve any interest in the lands.171 Thus, at the time of the deeds
to the current lot owners, Reese owned 50% of the minerals, and
Thomason and Lupton owned 50% of the minerals.172 Likening the case
to Titan, the court determined that the effect of the language in the deeds
from Thomason and Lupton to the current owners was to convey the
mineral and surface estates of the lands subject to any prior recorded
reservations, to-wit: the Reese reservation.173
Finally, the court held that the use of the word “all” in the deeds to the
current owners excepting “all oil, gas and other minerals as recorded” did
not clearly express an intent for Thomason and Lupton to retain a mineral
interest.174 The court reasoned that “all” did not necessarily mean 100% of
the minerals, rather, it meant that the interest excepted from the
conveyance was all of the interest as recorded in prior deeds.175 The court
further noted that the language was unclear at best, in which case the
language is to be construed against the grantor.176 As a result, the court

168. Id. at *2.
169. Id. at *3.
170. Id. at *2.
171. Thomason v. Badgett, No. 02-12-00303-CV, 2013 WL 3488254, at *2
(Tex. App.–Fort Worth July 11, 2013, petition denied) (memorandum opinion).
172. Id.
173. Id. (citing Farm & Ranch Investors, Ltd. v. Titan Operating, LLC, 369
S.W.3d 679, 684 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2012, petition denied).
174. Id. at *3.
175. Id. (emphasis added).
176. Id.
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affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that Thomason and Lupton
owned no interest in the subject lands.177
I. The Griswold Extension of the Pich Exception
The court in Griswold v. EOG Res., Inc., citing Pich as binding
precedent, held that a clause saving and excepting an interest “heretofore
reserved by predecessors in title” effectively excepted an interest in favor
of the grantor.178 It reasoned that the provision at issue was a clear and
unambiguous exception followed by a false recital.179
In 1926, R. Allred and his wife conveyed the subject lands to J.H.
Barker, reserving a one-half mineral interest.180 Thereafter, Rex Calaway
received a foreclosure judgment against both Barker and Allred, such that
the mineral estate and surface estate merged, and Calaway was vested with
the land via constable’s deed pursuant to the foreclosure judgment. 181
Next, Calaway conveyed the subject lands to R.E. Stewart, with no
reservations or exceptions.182 Ultimately, Dorothy Williams and Kathryn
Wellington were vested with ownership of the lands, with no intervening
mineral reservations or exceptions.183 Subsequently, Williams and
Wellington conveyed the subject lands to James and Diana Caswell
(hereinafter the Caswell Deed) with the following provision: “LESS,
SAVE AND EXCEPT an undivided [one-half] of all oil, gas and other
minerals found in, under[,] and that may be produced from the above
described tract of land heretofore reserved by predecessors in title.”184 The
Caswells then conveyed the subject lands to the Griswolds with an
identical save and except provision as shown above.185 The Griswolds then
leased the lands to EOG Resources, Inc. (EOG), and later brought suit after
EOG paid the Griswolds based on a one-half mineral interest.186 At trial,
the court granted EOG’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the
Griswolds owned only a one-half mineral interest in the lands.187

177. Thomason v. Badgett, No. 02-12-00303-CV, 2013 WL 3488254, at *3
(Tex. App.–Fort Worth July 11, 2013, petition denied) (memorandum opinion).
178. 459 S.W.3d 713, 720 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth, 2015, petition denied).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 716.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Griswold v. EOG Res., Inc., 459 S.W.3d 713, 716 (Tex. App.–Fort
Worth, 2015, petition denied).
185. Id. at 717.
186. Id. at 716–17.
187. Id. at 715–16.
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On appeal, the Griswolds argued that the exception in the Caswell
Deed was limited only to prior reservations in the chain of title, and that
because there were no such prior reservations, all of the mineral estate
passed to them via the deed.188 Contrarily, EOG argued that the provision
clearly expressed an intent to except a one-half mineral interest, and the
phrase “heretofore reserved by predecessors in title” was a false recital that
did not alter the interest excepted from the grant.189
After discussing the Greatest Estate Rule and Construe Against the
Grantor Rule, the court restated the technical distinctions between a
reservation and exception, further noting that a save-and-except clause can
fail to pass title in some instances, at which point title to the excepted
interest will remain in the grantor if the interest is not owned by a
predecessor-in-title.190
Furthermore, the court analogized the case with Pich, reasoning that
the similarities between the facts of both cases render Pich binding
authority on the matter.191 Like Pich, the court in Griswold explained that
the Caswell Deed included a plain and unambiguous exception of a onehalf mineral interest, followed by a phrase purporting to state why the
exception was made.192 In other words, the chain of title in Griswold
conclusively showed that there were no effective prior mineral
reservations from predecessors in title, as the only prior reservation had
been extinguished in the foreclosure judgment.193 Despite that the chain of
title conclusively negated the given reason for the exception, the court
explained that “the giving of a false reason for an exception from a grant
does not operate to alter or cut down the interest or estate excepted, nor
does it operate to pass the excepted interest or estate to the grantee.”194 As
a result, the court concluded that Williams and Wellington effectively
excepted a one-half mineral interest in favor of themselves via the Caswell
Deed, and affirmed the trial court’s judgment.195
Though it is fairly clear that the Griswold court’s adherence to the
ruling in Pich can be attributed mostly to the doctrine of stare decisis, it is
still helpful to note the differences between the cases to understand the
extension of the rule in Pich. In Pich, the provision at issue appeared as
follows: “Save and Except an undivided three-fourths of the oil, gas and
188. Id. at 718.
189. Id.
190. Griswold v. EOG Res., Inc., 459 S.W.3d 713, 718 (Tex. App.–Fort
Worth, 2015, petition denied).
191. Id. at 718–19.
192. Id. at 720.
193. Id.
194. Id. (quoting Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Tex. 1957).
195. Id.
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other minerals in, on and under said land, which have been heretofore
reserved.”196 Again, the court in Pich determined that this provision was a
clear exception of a three-fourths mineral interest, followed by a false
recital.197 Although the court did not emphasize the placement of the
comma in the provision, it is clear that a comma separates the exception
from the recital, which could have been a factor in the court’s reasoning.
In Griswold, however, the provision at issue was as follows: “LESS,
SAVE AND EXCEPT an undivided [one-half] of all oil, gas and other
minerals found in, under[,] and that may be produced from the above
described tract of land heretofore reserved by predecessors in title.” 198
Notably, the exception and false recital in the Griswold provision are not
separated by a comma, but rather appear as the same general clause. Yet,
despite this distinction, the courts in both Pich and Griswold reached the
same conclusion.
CONCLUSION
For the practitioner, it is helpful to consider several factors when
interpreting whether the provision at issue is a reservation, exception to
warranty, or exception to grant. Context, diction, and overall sentence
structure are imperative when interpreting these provisions. Generally, a
reservation is the easiest to spot, yet it is important to remember that the
term “reserve” is not strictly necessary to effectuate a reservation in favor
of the grantor.199
Next, when faced with “exception” language, the reader should
examine the provision closely to determine if the provision is an exception
to warranty or an exception to grant. Where the clause saves and excepts
only the interests “as reserved in prior conveyances,” Texas courts will
generally construe the provision as an exception to warranty.200 Likewise,
where the exception provision excepts an identical interest as reserved in

196. Pich, 302 S.W.2d at 646.
197. Id. at 648.
198. Griswold v. EOG Res., Inc., 459 S.W.3d 713, 716 (Tex. App.–Fort
Worth, 2015, petition denied).
199. See e.g., Houchins v. Devon Energy Prod. Co., No. 01-08-00273-CV,
2009 WL 3321406, at *4 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 15, 2009, petition
denied) (memorandum opinion) (holding that grantor’s use of words “retain” and
“exempt” clearly expressed an intent to reserve a mineral interest from the grant).
200. See generally Thomason v. Badgett, No. 02-12-00303-CV, 2013 WL
3488254, at *2 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth July 11, 2013, petition denied)
(memorandum opinion); Miller v. Melde, 730 S.W.2d 12, 13 (Tex. App.–Corpus
Christi 1987, no writ); Ladd v. DuBose, 344 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Tex. Civ. App.–
Amarillo 1961, no writ).
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a prior deed, courts are more likely to interpret the provision as an
exception to warranty.201
On the other hand, where the provision includes a clear and
unambiguous exception of an interest, followed by a false recital
purporting to state why the exception is being made, Texas law provides
that: (1) the exception is from the grant; (2) the excepted interest will not
pass to the grantee of the deed; and (3) the excepted interest will remain
in the grantor if another party does not own it.202 In such an instance, it is
important to know the context (e.g., the chain of title prior to the deed).
Essentially, if the exception appears before the recital and the chain of title
conclusively negates the recited reason for the exception, the recital is a
“false recital” that will not alter the fact that the interest is excepted from
the grant.203 Contrarily, where the structure of the provision is such that
the false recital appears before the exception, the provision is more likely
to be construed as an exception to warranty.204 Lastly, after a fact-intensive
analysis of the provision at issue under the common law rules set forth
above, the Greatest Estate Rule and the Construe Against the Grantor Rule
can provide guidance, and can ultimately tip the scale in favor of the
grantee of the deed when in doubt.

201. See generally Klein v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 67 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ.
App.–Beaumont 1934, writ granted), aff’d, 86 S.W.2d 1077 (Tex. 1935).
202. See generally Pich v. Lankford, 302 S.W.2d 645, 645 (Tex. 1957);
Griswold, 459 S.W.3d 713.
203. See Griswold, 459 S.W.3d at 720.
204. See generally Miller, 730 S.W.2d 12.

